Secure Vehicular Communication Systems: Design and Architecture by Papadimitratos, P. et al.
Secure Vehicular Communication Systems:
Design and Architecture
P. Papadimitratos, L. Buttyan, T. Holczer, E. Schoch, J. Freudiger, M. Raya
Z. Ma, F. Kargl, A. Kung, J.-P. Hubaux
Abstract— Significant developments took place over the past
few years in the area of vehicular communication (VC) systems.
Now, it is well-understood in the community that security and
protection of private user information are a prerequisite for the
deployment of the technology. This is so exactly because the
benefits of VC systems, with the mission to enhance transporta-
tion safety and efficiency, are at stake. Without the integration of
strong and practical security and privacy enhancing mechanisms,
VC systems could be disrupted or disabled even by relatively
unsophisticated attackers. We address this problem within the
SeVeCom project, having developed a security architecture that
provides a comprehensive and practical solution. We present our
results in a set of two papers in this issue. In this first one, we
analyze threats and types of adversaries, we identify security and
privacy requirements, and present a spectrum of mechanisms to
secure VC systems. We provide a solution that can be quickly
adopted and deployed. Our progress towards implementation of
our architecture, along with results on the performance of the
secure VC system, are presented in the second paper. We conclude
with an investigation, based on current results, of upcoming
elements to be integrated in our secure VC architecture.
I. INTRODUCTION
After the deployment of various vehicular technologies,
such as toll collection or active road-signs, vehicular commu-
nication (VC) systems are emerging. They comprise network
nodes, that is, vehicles and road-side infrastructure units
(RSUs), equipped with on-board sensory, processing, and
wireless communication modules. Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V)
and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communication can enable
a range of applications to enhance transportation safety and
efficiency, as well as infotainment. For example, they can send
warnings on environmental hazards (e.g., ice on the pavement),
traffic and road conditions (e.g., emergency braking, conges-
tion, or construction sites), and local (e.g., tourist) information.
The unique features of VC are a double-edged sword: a
rich set of tools will be available but a formidable set of
abuses and attacks becomes possible. Consider, for example,
an attacker that “contaminates” large portions of the vehicular
network with false information: a single compromised vehicle
can transmit false hazard warnings, which can then be taken
up by all vehicles in both traffic streams. Or a tampered
vehicle that forges messages to masquerade as an emergency
vehicle to mislead other vehicles to slow down and yield. Or a
different type of attacker, which deploys a number of receivers,
records messages transmitted by the vehicles, especially safety
beacons which report the vehicle’s location, to track a vehicle’s
location and transactions, and infer private information about
its driver and passengers.
It is clear that to thwart such attacks, security and privacy-
enhancing mechanisms are necessary; in fact, they are a
prerequisite for deployment. Otherwise VC systems could
make anti-social and criminal behavior easier, in ways that
would actually jeopardize the benefits of their deployment.
This has been recently well understood in academia, the
industry, and among authorities; and a number of concerted
efforts have been undertaken to design security architectures
for VC systems.
A prominent example of those efforts is our three-year
European-funded Secure Vehicular Communications (SeVe-
Com) Project (http://www.sevecom.org), which is approaching
its conclusion at the end of 2008. In this project, universities,
car manufacturers, and car equipment suppliers collaborate on
the design of a baseline architecture that provides a level of
protection sought by users and legislators and is practical.
Our baseline architecture is based on well-established and
understood cryptographic primitives but can also be tuned or
augmented, to meet more stringent future requirements.
In this paper, we first discuss the capabilities of attackers.
Then, we present the requirements based on which we develop
our architecture. The basic aspects we seek to address are:
identity and cryptographic key management, privacy protec-
tion, secure communication, and in-car protection. Next, we
provide details on credential management and cryptographic
support, which enable secure and privacy-enhancing commu-
nication. We conclude with a short discussion that ushers our
second article, which is concerned with implementation and
performance issues, and upcoming research challenges.
II. ADVERSARY MODEL
VC system entities can be correct or benign, that is, comply
with the implemented protocols, or they may deviate from the
protocol definition, that is, be faulty or adversarial. Adversar-
ial behavior can vary widely, according to the implemented
protocols and the capabilities of the adversary. Its incentive
may be own benefit or malice. We do not consider here benign
faults, for example, communication errors, message delaying
or loss, which can occur either under normal operational
conditions or due to equipment failure. Instead, we focus
on adversarial behavior, which can cause a much larger set
of faults. We do not dwell on individual VC protocols for
which to describe attacks. Rather, we survey the capabilities
of adversaries and discuss aspects relevant to the VC context.
A more detailed exposition, which also discusses models used
in other types of distributed systems, is available in [9].
ar
X
iv
:0
91
2.
53
91
v1
  [
cs
.C
R]
  3
0 D
ec
 20
09
Even though the VC protocol implementations will be
proprietary, open definitions of standards will provide attackers
with detailed knowledge about the system operation. Any
wireless device that runs a rogue version of the VC protocol
stack poses a threat. Attackers can either be passive or active.
Active adversaries can meaningfully modify in-transit mes-
sages they relay, beyond the modifications the protocol defi-
nitions allow or require them to perform. Or, more generally,
they can forge, that is, synthesize in a manner non-compliant to
the protocols and system operation, and inject messages. Since
adversaries are aware of the VC protocols, they can choose
any combination of these actions according to their own prior
observations (messages they received) and the protocol they
attempt to compromise. An active adversary may also jam
communications, that is, interfere deliberately and prevent
other devices within its range to communicate. Or, it can replay
messages that it received and were previously transmitted by
other system entities. In contrast to active adversaries, passive
attackers only learn information about system entities and
cannot affect or change their behavior.
It is important to distinguish adversaries equipped with
cryptographic keys and credentials that entitle them to partic-
ipate in the execution of the VC system protocols. We denote
those as internal adversaries. In contrast, adversaries that do
not possess such keys and credentials are external. We em-
phasize that the possession of credentials does not guarantee
correct operation of the nodes. For example, the on-board
units (OBUs) can be tampered with and their functionality
modified (e.g., by installing a rogue version of the protocol
stack). Or, the cryptographic keys of an RSU or a vehicle can
be compromised (e.g., physically extracted from an unattended
vehicle) and be utilized by an adversarial device. If this were
the case, a node with multiple (compromised) keys could
appear as multiple nodes.
More generally, multiple adversarial nodes can be present
in the network at different locations. They can be acting
independently or they may collude, i.e., exchange information
and coordinate their actions, in order to mount a more effective
attack.1 For example, they could all report an imaginary event
(e.g., traffic jam or accident), in order to mislead correct nodes
to think this is indeed the case. Over time, the set of adversarial
nodes can change both in numbers and locations. On the
one hand, the compromised nodes, for example, illegally
modified vehicles, can increase over time, as drivers may have
some benefit in doing so. On the other hand, fault detection
mechanisms and diagnostics, along with policy enforcement
can lead to gradual eradication of faulty devices.
Overall, however, it is reasonable to expect that only a
relatively small fraction of the VC devices will be adversaries.
Of course this depends on the appropriate design of the system,
which should not allow for easy exploits (e.g., malware
propagation). Moreover, the majority of the users will not
have the expertise and the motivation to tamper with their
1We emphasize though that even in that case, adversaries are computation-
ally limited and unable to break keys of other nodes.
VC devices, while maintenance will address the majority of
equipment faults.
Given a small fraction of faulty (adversarial) devices, the
adversary will have overall limited physical presence. Since
the transmission range of faulty devices cannot be unbounded,
even if they had customized hardware that exceeds the com-
munication range of vehicular or road-side devices, the ad-
versaries can affect only a fraction of the VC system area.
Within this area, they can cause denial of service and do it
in a selective manner, i.e., erase one or more messages sent
by other nodes. This does not preclude that a few adversarial
devices surround a correct node (vehicle) at some point in
time. But most often and in most locations, correct nodes will
encounter few or only a single adversary.
Due to the nature of VC systems, with vehicles equipped
with a number of sensors, exchange of false measurements
can compromise the VC-enabled applications. An arguably
convenient attack, in the sense that it may be relatively easy
to mount, is by controlling the sensory inputs to the OBU
instead of attempting to compromise the OBU or its crypto-
graphic keys. Tampering with a sensor or with the OBU-sensor
connection may indeed be simpler. It is not easy to classify
an input-controlling adversary as external or internal. On the
one hand, no access to credentials and cryptographic material
is necessary. On the other hand, messages generated and
transmitted due to the input-controlling adversary originate
from a legitimate system participant. What we should note
though is that such an adversary is relatively weaker than an
internal one: controlling inputs alone cannot induce arbitrary
behavior, if self-diagnostics and other controls are available
and out of reach of the adversary.
III. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
The problem at hand is to secure the operation of VC
systems, that is, design protocols that mitigate attacks and
thwart deviations from the implemented protocols to the
greatest possible extent. Different protocols have their own
specifications, that is, sought properties. Rather than providing
an exhaustive enumeration of requirements per protocol and
application, we identify first a set of stand-alone requirements.
Then, we outline a number of example VC applications along
with the related security requirements.
The identified stand-alone security requirements are the
following:
Message Authentication and Integrity, to protect against
any alteration and allow the receiver of a message to corrob-
orate the sender of the message.
Message Non-Repudiation, so that the sender of a message
cannot deny having sent a message.
Entity Authentication, so that a receiver is ensured that the
sender generated a message and has evidence of the liveness of
the sender. In other words, ascertain that a received unmodified
message was generated within an interval [t− τ, t], with t the
current time at the receiver and τ > 0 a sufficiently small
positive value.
Access Control, to determine via specific system-wide
policies the assignment of distinct roles to different types of
nodes and their allowed actions within the system. As part of
access control, authorization establishes what each node is
allowed to do in the network, e.g., which types of messages
it can insert in the network, or more generally the protocols
it is allowed to execute.
Message Confidentiality, to keep the content of a message
secret from those nodes not authorized to access it.
Accountability, to be able to map security-related events to
system entities.
Privacy Protection, to safeguard private information of the
VC system users. This is a general requirement that relates
to the protection of private information stored off-line. In the
context of communication, which is the object of SeVeCom,
we are interested in anonymity for the actions (messages and
transactions) of the vehicles. We elaborate on the VC-specific
aspects that we seek to address next.
For privacy, along with security, we focus on private vehi-
cles (e.g., excluding emergency vehicles, buses, etc). This is
so, as the operation of all other VC nodes, including RSUs,
does not raise any privacy concerns, and all those other nodes
should be readily identifiable. A primary concern for VC
systems is to provide location privacy, that is, prevent others
(any observer) from learning past or future locations of a VC
system user (vehicle driver or passenger). With our focus on
VC, we can safeguard location privacy by seeking to satisfy a
more general requirement, anonymity for the vehicle message
transmissions.
Ideally, it should be impossible for any observer to learn if
a specific vehicle transmitted or will transmit in the future a
message (more generally, take an action, that is, be involved in
a VC protocol), and it should be impossible to link any two
or more messages (in general, actions) of the same vehicle.
Even if an observer tried to guess, that should leave only a
low probability of linking a vehicle’s actions or identifying it
among the set of all vehicles, the anonymity set. We will elab-
orate on this notion when we discuss below the management
of identities and credentials for VC system entities.
Rather than aiming for this strong anonymity, we require
a relatively weaker level of protection: messages should not
allow the identification of their sender, and two or more
messages generated by the same vehicle should be difficult
to link to each other. More precisely, messages produced by a
vehicle over a protocol-selectable period of time τ can always
be linked by an observer that received them. But messages
m1,m2 generated at times t1, t2 such that t2 > t1+ τ cannot.
In terms of the observer, we assume that its physical presence
is bounded, as stated earlier for the adversary.
In addition, features that enhance availability are required,
to enable protocols and services to remain operational even
in the presence of faults, malicious or benign. This implies
resilience to resource depletion attacks, as well as self-stable
protocols which resume their normal operation after the “re-
moval” of the faulty participants.
Based on these considerations, SeVeCom performed a de-
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Intersection collision warning
√
V2V 2 2 2
Emergency vehicle signal
√
V2I
√
2 2 0
Work zone warning
√
V2I
√
1 2 0
Forward collision warning
√
V2V
√
2 2 2
Cooperative adaptive cruise control V2V
√
2 2 2
TABLE I
SAMPLED VC APPLICATIONS: FEATURES AND IMPORTANCE OF SECURITY
REQUIREMENTS.
tailed requirements analysis where general application char-
acteristics and security requirements were assessed for a
large number of VC applications [6]. Table I shows a small
excerpt from this analysis, with higher values indicating higher
importance of a given requirement. For example, for a work
zone warning message, it may be relatively less important
to rigidly determine its recency. For a collision avoidance
application though, it is crucial to ensure the message recency.
Of course, for both applications, it is critical to ensure that
no message content is fabricated by an attacker. Regarding
privacy protection, this is not required for infrastructure-
or public vehicle-sent messages, as are the work zone and
emergency vehicle warnings.
IV. SECURE VC SYSTEM OVERVIEW
Our architecture addresses the following fundamental is-
sues: (i) identity, credential, and key management, and (ii)
secure communication. We focus primarily on securing the
operation of the wireless part of the VC system, and enhancing
the privacy of its users, seeking to satisfy the requirements we
outlined earlier in this article. We are fully aware of the pro-
jected co-existence of VC-specific and TCP/IP protocol stacks
in VC systems. Moreover, towards further strengthening our
architecture, we have investigated and developed approaches
to address in-car protection and data consistency, discussed
in [7]. An abstract view of the secure VC system, with nodes
(vehicles and RSUs) and authorities (CAA and CAB), is
shown in Fig. 1. We outline next the main elements of our
architecture.
Authorities Drawing from the analogy with existing ad-
ministrative processes and automotive authorities (e.g., city
or state transit authorities), we assume that a large number
of Certification Authorities (CAs) will be instantiated. Each
CA is responsible for a region (national territory, district,
county, etc.) and manages identities and credentials of all
nodes registered with it. To enable interactions between nodes
from different regions, CAs provide certificates for other
CAs (cross-certification) or provide foreigner certificates to
vehicles that are register with another CA when they cross the
geographical boundaries of their region [10].
Secure and Privacy-Enhancing 
V2V and V2I Single- and Multi-
hop Wireless Communication
RSUA RSUB
CABCAA
Secure Wire-line 
Communication
Fig. 1. Abstract View of the Secure Vehicular Communication System.
Node Identification Each node is registered with only one
CA, and has a unique long-term identity and a pair of private
and public cryptographic keys, and it is equipped with a
long-term certificate. A list of node attributes and a lifetime
are included in the certificate, which the CA issues upon
node registration and upon certificate expiration. The CA is
also responsible for the eviction of nodes or the withdrawal
of compromised cryptographic keys via revocation of the
corresponding certificates. In all cases, the interaction of nodes
with the CA is infrequent and intermittent, with the road-side
infrastructure acting as a gateway to and from the vehicular
part of the network, with the use of other infrastructure (e.g.,
cellular) also possible. The conceptual view of VC nodes
is illustrated in Fig. 2. The node identity and credential
management and the role of the HSM, methods to secure
V2V and V2I communication, and CA-vehicle interactions
(V2CA) that include the issuance of short-term credentials
to secure vehicle transmissions, are discussed in the rest of
the paper. The in-car system and data processing functionality
are discussed in [7].
Hardware Security Module (HSM) We envision that both
vehicles and RSUs are equipped with an HSM, whose purpose
is to store and physically protect sensitive information and
provide a secure time base. This information is primarily
private keys for signature generation. If modules were to be
tampered with, to extract private keys, the physical protection
of the unit would ensure that the sensitive information (private
keys) would be erased, thus preventing the adversary from
obtaining them. In addition, the HSM performs all private
key cryptographic operations with the stored keys, in order to
ensure that sensitive information never leaves the physically
secured HSM environment. Essentially, the HSM is the basis
of trust; without it, private keys could be compromised and
their holders could masquerade as legitimate system nodes.
Secure Communication Digital signatures are the basic
tool to secure communications, used for all messages. To
Unique ID Long-termPublic Key
Long-Term
Certificate
HSM: Private Keys Storage and Operations
Short-term
Public Key 1
Short-term
Certificate 1
Short-term
Public Key n
Short-term
Certificate n
Secure Communication
V2V V2I V2CA
Data Processing
(Validation, 
Consistency, 
Dissemination)
In-car system
Sensory Inputs
Fig. 2. Conceptual Secure VC Architecture View: Node functionality.
satisfy both the security and anonymity requirements, we
rely on a pseudonymous authentication approach. Rather than
utilizing the same long-term public and private key for secur-
ing communications, each vehicle utilizes multiple short-term
private-public key pairs and certificates. A mapping between
the short-term credentials and the long-term identity of each
node is maintained by the CA.
The basic idea is that (i) each vehicle is equipped with
multiple certified public keys (pseudonyms) that do not reveal
the node identity, and (ii) the vehicle uses each of them for
a short period of time, and then switches to another, not
previously used pseudonym. This way, messages signed under
different pseudonyms cannot be linked. Signatures, calculated
over the message payload, a time-stamp and the coordinates
of the sender, can be generated by the originator of a message
as well as relaying nodes, depending on the protocol function-
ality. We provide security for frequently broadcasted beacon
messages for safety, restricted flooding of messages within a
geographical region or a hop-distance from the sender, and
position-based routing used to transmit messages through a
single route of relay nodes, where the nodes select as next hop
their neighbor with minimum remaining geographical distance
to the destination position.
V. CREDENTIAL MANAGEMENT AND CRYPTOGRAPHIC
SUPPORT
The management of credentials, both short and long-term,
is undertaken by the CAs, which are also responsible for
the revocation of credentials for any node if needed, as well
as holding the node accountable, by mapping node com-
munications to its long-term identity. Public key operations
are performed by the OBU, but all private key operations
are performed by the HSM, which is essentially the trusted
computing base of the secure VC system.
A. Identity and Credential Management
1) Long-Term Identification: Each node X has a unique
long-term identity IDX , which will be the outcome of an
agreement between car manufacturers and authorities, similar
to the use of Vehicle Identification Numbers (VINs). Identifiers
of the same format will be assigned both to vehicles and road-
side units. Each identity is associated with a cryptographic key
pair (SKX ,PKX), and a set of attributes of node X . The
attributes reflect technical characteristics of the node equip-
ment (for example, type, dimensions, sensors and computing
platform), as well as the role of the node in the system. Nodes
can be, for example, private or public vehicles (buses), or
vehicles with special characteristics (police patrol cars), or
RSUs, with or without any special characteristics (offering
connectivity to the Internet). The assignment of an identity,
the selection of attributes appropriate for each node, and the
generation of the certificate are performed “off-line,” at the
time the node is registered with the CA. The lifetime of the
certificate is naturally long, following the node life-cycle (or
a significant fraction of it).
2) Short-Term Identification: To obtain pseudonyms,
a vehicle V ’s HSM generates a set of key pairs
{(SK1V , PK1V ), ..., (SKiV , PKiV )} and sends the public keys
to a corresponding CA via a secured communication channel.
V utilizes its long-term identity IDV to authenticate itself to
the CA. The CA signs each of the public keys, PKiV , and gen-
erates a set of pseudonyms for V . Each pseudonym contains
an identifier of the CA, the lifetime of the pseudonym, the
public key, and the signature of the CA; thus, no information
about the identity of the vehicle.
Pseudonyms are stored and managed in the on-board
pseudonym pool, with their corresponding secret keys kept
in the HSM. This ensures that each vehicle has exactly one
key pair (own pseudonym pseudonym and private key) that
is active during each time period. Moreover, once the switch
from the (SKj , PKj) to the j+1-st key pair (SKj+1, PKj+1)
is done, no messages can be further signed with SKj ; even
if the certificate for PKj is not yet expired. In other words,
pseudonymity cannot be abused: For example, a rogue vehicle
cannot sign multiple beacons each with a different SKj over
a short period, and thus cannot appear as multiple vehicles.2
A vehicle needs to contact the CA, infrequently but regu-
larly, to obtain a new set of pseudonyms. For example, if a
vehicle utilizes pseudonyms in set i, it obtains the (i + 1)-st
set of pseudonyms while it can still operate with the i-th set.
It switches to the (i+1)-st set once no pseudonym in the i-th
set can be used. We term this process a pseudonym refill.
Due to the requirement for accountability, the CA archives
the issued pseudonyms together with the vehicle’s long-term
identity. In case of an investigation, an authorized party can
ask the CA to perform a pseudonym resolution: Reveal the
link of a specific pseudonym to the long-term identity of the
2The CA could prevent abuse of the pseudonymity by issuing short-
term certificates with non-overlapping lifetimes. We also note that multiple
pseudonyms can active simultaneously only when used for completely disjoint
communication (e.g., one for all safety messaging and one for infotainment
downloads.
vehicle (this leading further to its registered owner).
By using the same pseudonym only for a short period of
time and switching to a new one, vehicle activities can be
only linked over the period of using the same pseudonym.
Changing pseudonyms makes it difficult for an adversary to
link messages from the same vehicle and track its movements.
However, the inclusion of the identity of the CAA issuing the
credential (pseudonym) implies that the vehicle is part of the
set of all vehicles registered with CAA. In fact, this is the
anonymity set of vehicle V . This implies that, for example, a
Swiss vehicle should be anonymous within the set of all Swiss
vehicles.
This division of vehicles into disjoint subsets, one per CA,
allows an observer to rule out a significant portion of vehi-
cles given geographical constraints. Consider again a Swiss
vehicle, driving in the East Balkans where it is not likely to
encounter numerous other vehicles with the same registration.
An observer could then be successful with high probability
in guessing that all Swiss pseudonyms (and thus associated
messages) are used by the same Swiss vehicle. To prevent such
inferences, we require that vehicles crossing the boundaries
of a foreign region, B, obtain short-term credentials from the
local CAB [10]. In our example, V would have to first prove
to CAB it is registered with CAA, then obtain pseudonyms
by CAB , and use them exclusively while in region B. This
way, it would avoid “standing out” in region B, appearing to
any observer of the VC system traffic as part of the anonymity
set B.
B. Hardware Security Module
The Hardware Security Module (HSM) is the trusted com-
puting base of the SeVeCom security architecture. It stores the
private cryptographic key material, and provides cryptographic
functions to be used by other modules. The HSM is physically
separated from the On-Board Unit (OBU), and it has some
tamper resistant properties in order to protect the private key
material against physical attacks. The HSM consists of a CPU,
some non-volatile memory, a built-in clock, and some I/O
interface. In addition, the HSM has a built-in battery in order
to power the clock and the tamper detection and reaction
circuitry.
The main HSM functions include cryptographic operations,
as well as key and device management functions. The main
cryptographic operations provided by the HSM are the digital
signature generation and the decryption of encrypted mes-
sages. The digital signature generation function is mainly used
by the secure communication module (see Sec. VI) for signing
outgoing messages. The HSM always includes a timestamp
in every signature that it generates, which makes it possible
to detect replay attacks. The decryption function is mainly
used by the pseudonym handling application, which receives
the anonymous certificates in an encrypted form from the
pseudonym provider.
The HSM handles short-term keys for the short-term identi-
fication and long-term keys for the long-term identification of
the vehicle. These keys are generated by the HSM, and only
Local monitoring (MDS), 
eviction (LEAVE), and
V2V CRL distribution
RSUA RSUB
CA
RHSM and RC2RL
Distribution of CRLs,
with encoded, self-verifiable 
pieces
Fig. 3. Solutions of the Revocation Problem in VC Systems.
the public keys are output from the device. The generation of
short-term keys can be initiated by any application running
on the OBU. In contrast, the long-term keys are generated at
manufacturing time, however, they can be updated later by
trusted authorities.
Device management and long-term key update are achieved
through signed commands from the CA. In order to verify
the signature on these commands, the HSM stores trusted
root public keys that are loaded into the device during the
initialization procedure in a secure environment. We envision
two such root public keys, K1 and K2, in the HSM, with
the corresponding private keys held by the CA. In case one
of the CA’a private keys is compromised, the corresponding
public key, say K1, can be revoked, as discussed in the next
paragraph. The revocation command must be signed with the
private key corresponding to K1 itself. Once K1 is revoked,
a new key K ′1 can be loaded into the HSM by a command
signed with the private key corresponding to K2. In addition,
when K1 is revoked, the HSM does not accept commands
aimed at revoking K2. This scheme ensures secure root key
update unless both root keys are compromised.
As discussed next, CA commands can include revocation of
the entire device. The revocation of the HSM is achieved by a
signed kill command, which deletes every piece of information
from the memory, making the device unusable. Further device
management functions include device initialization, and clock
synchronization. During device initialization, the main param-
eters of the HSM, as well as the root public keys are loaded
in the HSM. Clock synchronization allows for synchronizing
the internal clock of the HSM to a trusted external clock.
C. Revocation
The certificates of faulty nodes have to be revoked, to
prevent them from causing damage to the VC system. Revo-
cation can be decided by the CA because of administrative
or technical reasons. The basic mechanism to achieve this
are Certificate Revocation Lists (CRLs) the CA creates and
authenticates. The challenge is to distribute effectively and
efficiently the CRLs, which can be achieved by a combination
of methods illustrated in Fig. 3.
We leverage on the road-side infrastructure to distribute
CRLs. We find that with RSUs placed on the average some
kilometers apart, and with CRL distribution by each RSU
at a few kbps, all vehicles can obtain CRLs of hundreds of
kilobytes over a time period of an average commute [10]. This
is achieved primarily due the use of encoding of CRLs into
numerous (cryptographically) self-verifiable pieces and low-
rate broadcast transmission of CRL pieces. In areas with no
RSUs, V2V CRL distribution initiated by vehicles that were
previously in contact with RSUs, or use of other communica-
tion technologies, could have a complementary role. The size
of CRLs and the overall amount of revocation information to
be distributed can still be a challenge. At first, collaboration
between CAs, so that CRLs contain only regional revocation
information, can keep the CRL size low [10].
Revocation can leverage on the HSM, with the CA initiating
the RHSM (Revocation of the HSM) protocol [13], issuing
a “kill” command signed with the private key corresponding
to one of the root public keys. If a HSM receives a kill
command, it deletes everything from its memory including its
own private keys, to prevent the generation of any new keys or
signatures by the compromised module. The CA determines
the location of the vehicle and sends the kill command via
the nearest RSU(s). The HSM has to confirm the reception
of this command by sending an ACK before erasing the long
term signature generation key (SKX). If communication via
the RSUs fails (i.e., an ACK is not received after a timeout),
the CA can broadcast the command via the RDS (Radio Data
System).
If the adversary controls the CA-HSM communication, the
CRL-based revocation has to be performed. This can also be
done via the RC2RL (Revocation using Compressed Certificate
Revocation Lists) protocol [13], which can reduce the size of
CRLs by a lossy compression scheme, notably Bloom filters,
to the extent they could be transmitted even over the RDS.
The identification of a revoked certificate in the Bloom filter
is always possible (zero false negative rate), along with a con-
figurable low false positive rate. An occasional revocation of
“innocent” credentials, traded-off for compression (efficiency),
is not an issue when RC2RL revokes large numbers of short-
term credentials.
The inclusion of credentials in a CRL implies that the CA
has established the need to revoke the node. If this is because
of faulty behavior, the absence of an omni-present monitoring
facility makes the detection harder. Moreover, CRLs will be
issued rather infrequently (e.g., once per day), thus leaving
a vulnerability window until a faulty node is revoked. To
address this, we propose that misbehavior detection is left
to vehicles, which can then defend themselves by locally
voting off and excluding misbehaving vehicles. We propose
the use of two localized defense schemes, MDS (Misbehavior
Detection System) and LEAVE (Local Eviction of Attackers
Beacon packet
Payload: m
Cert(PK1)
Sig(SK1, H, m)
1. Generate signature 
with SK1
2. Append certificate
3. Send packet
Header: H
1. Validate certificate (if 
not previously done so) 
2. Validate signature
3. Validate geo-stamp in 
the header
4. Accept/Reject packet
Fig. 4. Example of Secure Communication: Secure Beaconing
by Voting Evaluators) [13]. The first allows the neighbors of
a misbehaving node detect it, and the second enables them
to exclude it from the local VC operation. After a LEAVE
execution, the evaluators report the misbehaving node to the
CA; a node can be revoked by the CA, using one of the
previously described approaches, after having been evicted a
threshold number of times by its (changing) neighbors.
VI. SECURE COMMUNICATION
A. Secure Beaconing
Beaconing denotes periodic single-hop broadcasts typically
used for the so-called Cooperative Awareness applications. In
order to create awareness of other vehicles in the vicinity,
every beacon contains information on the sender’s status such
as vehicle position, speed, and heading. The frequency of
beacon packets is expected to range from about 10Hz to 1Hz
for most use cases.
As already introduced, beacon messages are digitally signed
and the signer’s certificate is attached. More precisely, after the
beacon message assembly is complete and before submitting
a message m to the MAC layer for transmission, the sending
node (V ) calculates a signature sig(m), using the private key
SK(j, V ) corresponding to the j-th pseudonym PK(j, V ) that
is currently in use. V includes a time-stamp and a geographic
position at the instant of transmission, together termed as a
geo-stamp. Beyond the signature sig(m) that covers all these
fields, V also attaches CertA{PK(j, V )}, which attests the
validity of SK(j, V ). When a beacon message arrives at the
receiver, he can verify the message signature using PK(j, V )
in the certificate. The attached certificate CertX{PK(j, V )}
can be verified using the pre-installed public key of CAA (See
Fig. 4).
These measures achieve four goals. First, the receiver of
a beacon message can verify its sender is a valid participant
of the VC system (either vehicle or RSU). Second, no node
can impersonate another node without compromising its HSM.
Third, the integrity of the message is protected, as manipula-
tions are detected if the signature is invalid. Finally, the use of
the geo-stamp, along with the signature, allows the detection of
replay attacks. Details on replay protection mechanisms follow
in the next section.
B. Secure Neighbor Discovery
Cooperative awareness or safety messaging allow vehicles
to discover a frequently updated view of other vehicles in
proximity, that is, physical neighbors. In addition, for the
purpose of communication, it is important that vehicles also
discover other nodes (vehicles or RSUs) that are directly
reachable, that is, their communication neighbors. Typically,
it is assumed that if two nodes are communication neighbors
then they are physical neighbors, and vice versa. However, this
is not the case because adversaries mount relay attacks, that
is, receive and quickly retransmit (replay) messages of remote
nodes [11].
The inclusion of sender time-stamp and location, along
with authentication, enable our system to perform provably
secure neighbor discovery against external adversaries [12].
The basic idea is to estimate the sender-receiver distance based
on own coordinates and the location in the received message
and time-of-flight (difference between own time and received
timestamp). For a protocol-selectable acceptable neighbor
range, the receiving node accepts the sender as communication
neighbor when the two distance estimates are equal and the
sender is authenticated. As a result, vehicles can be ensured
that their neighbor table includes only nodes that are indeed
communication neighbors.
C. Secure GeoCast
In vehicular communication, the range covered by one-hop
beaconing is often not sufficient. Information on certain events
such as accidents need to be disseminated in larger areas. This
is achieved by Geocast, which comprises three elements: (i)
addressing of a geographically defined destination region, (ii)
forwarding towards this region and (iii) distribution of the
packet within the destination region. Position-based routing,
that is, multi-hop, single-path forwarding of packets towards
a geographically defined destination, has been shown well-
suited to the dynamics of vehicular networks. Position-based
routing is realized by greedy routing protocols such as GPSR
or CGGC. The distribution of messages among all nodes
within the destination region can be done by simple flooding
or by more efficient approaches to multi-hop broadcast. In
case of simple flooding, every node inside the destination
region rebroadcasts the message once and records its sequence
number to suppress re-broadcasting of the same message.
As a basic security measure for both position-based routing
and message distribution, source nodes sign created mes-
sages and attach the corresponding certificate, similarly to
the functionality for Secure Beaconing. Moreover, forwarding
nodes can also sign packets they relay, so that they can
be authenticated by the next-hop relay [5]. This way, only
qualified network participants can create messages that are
accepted by others and message integrity is protected towards
the destination. Replay and neighbor discovery attacks can be
prevented, as discussed in the previous section.
Since beaconing is the basis for position-based forwarding
decisions, the location given in beacons can be forged, with
data delivery failures (when traffic is attracted by the attacker),
and increased network load (due to routing loops). We propose
a position verification approach based on plausibility heuris-
tics that is capable to detect such position falsifications [8].
Second, changing pseudonyms for privacy reasons leads to
increased instability in nodes’ neighbor tables. This can result
in transmission faults to the next hop, because a node is
not reachable any more after a pseudonym change, which
deteriorate routing performance [14]. To balance network and
privacy needs, we can extend routing mechanisms by a MAC
layer callback that notifies the routing layer about missed
neighbors. Finally, to mitigate resource depletion attacks, with
an internal adversary distributing at high rates messages across
a large destination region, we propose rate limiting.
D. Pseudonym Handling
An adversary analyzing which certificate are attached to
signed messages can track the location of vehicles over time.
Hence, we propose to load each vehicle with multiple certified
public keys (i.e., pseudonyms) that it uses for short periods
of time. If pseudonyms are changed at appropriate time and
location, messages signed under different pseudonyms are hard
to be linked by an adversary.
As the adversary could use information from other layers
of the communication stack to track vehicles (e.g., MAC,
IP), a change of pseudonym should be accompanied by a
change of the vehicle identifiers in underlying protocols as
well. Still, using the location contained in messages to match
pseudonyms, an adversary can indirectly identify vehicles by
predicting the next position of vehicle even if a vehicle has a
new pseudonym. Cloaking of location information [4] is not a
solution as it would jeopardize the use of safety applications.
In [2], we propose that vehicles change pseudonyms in regions
not monitored by an adversary. These regions are called mix
zones [1] as the vehicles by changing pseudonyms will mix
with each other. We also suggest that vehicles change their
pseudonym at regular intervals maximizing the probability
of changing pseudonym in a mix zone. In [3], we explore
another approach that creates un-monitored regions by en-
crypting communications (i.e., cryptographic mix zones) in
small regions with the help of the road infrastructure.
The general idea of mix zones is explained as follows: If
only one vehicle changes its pseudonym in a mix zone, an
adversary observing vehicles entering and exiting the region
can trivially track vehicles as only one pseudonym changed.
But if more than one vehicle changes pseudonym in a mix
zone, the adversary must consider every possible matchings
of entering and exiting vehicles and estimate the most likely
matching given its belief about the mobility of vehicles, the
time to traverse the mix zone and the geometry of the mix zone
(Fig. 5). An adversary will thus find several possible matchings
t
t
pnym1 pnym2
pnym3 pnym4
Fig. 5. Privacy Protection: Given vehicles entering and exiting a mix
zone with different pseudonyms, the adversary must predict the most likely
matching of event.
weighted with different probabilities. To measure the amount
of location privacy achieved by vehicles in the mix zone, we
capture the uncertainty of the adversary with the notion of
entropy as defined in [15]. With this metric, if all possible
matchings look equally likely to an adversary, (i.e. the mix
zone is very unpredictable), the adversary is highly inefficient
in tracking vehicles. In general, the more vehicles are in a mix
zone, the more difficult it is for an adversary to obtain a good
estimation of probabilities as many combinations are possible.
If the mobility of the vehicles is so that they are equally likely
to enter/exit the mix zone from any road, it is difficult for the
adversary to obtain precise predictions.
When vehicles change pseudonyms in un-monitored regions
of the network, then mix zones are large and it is difficult
for an adversary to obtain good estimations. However, when
mix zones are created by the use of cryptography, then they
tend to be smaller, and thus must be located appropriately
to maximize their effectiveness (e.g., at traffic intersections).
Hence, linking messages signed under different pseudonyms
becomes increasingly hard over time and space for an ad-
versary. As vehicles will change pseudonyms several times
before reaching destination, the adversary will accumulate
more uncertainty and like in mix network [15], mobile nodes
can achieve a high level of location privacy.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have developed a security architecture for VC systems,
aiming at a solution that is both comprehensive and prac-
tical. We have studied the problem at hand systematically,
identifying threats and models of adversarial behavior as
well as security and privacy requirements that are relevant
to the VC context. We introduced a range of mechanisms,
to handle identity and credential management, and to secure
communication while enhancing privacy. In the second paper
of this contribution, we discuss implementation and perfor-
mance aspects, present a gamut of research investigations
and results towards further strengthening secure VC systems
and addressing remaining research challenges towards further
development and deployment of our architecture.
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